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Abstract
We consider entry-level medical markets for physicians in the United
Kingdom. These markets experienced failures which led to the adop-
tion of centralized market mechanisms in the 1960's. However, dier-
ent regions introduced dierent centralized mechanisms. We advise
physicians who do not have detailed information about the rank-order
lists submitted by the other participants. We demonstrate that in each
of these markets in a low information environment it is not benecial
to reverse the true ranking of any two acceptable hospital positions.
We further show that (i) in the Edinburgh 1967 market ranking un-
acceptable matches as acceptable is not protable for any participant
and (ii) in any other British entry-level medical market it is possible
that only strategies which rank unacceptable positions as acceptable
are optimal for a physician.
JEL classication: C78, D81, J44.
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1 Introduction
We consider entry-level medical markets for physicians in the United King-
dom. Until the 1960's graduating students were themselves responsible for
nding their rst hospital positions and hospitals were responsible for lling
their vacancies. As a result of the competition among students for desirable
positions, hospitals contracted earlier and earlier promising students.
1
By the
1940's hospitals were appointing promising students two years before they
were nishing their education. This often caused subsequent regret because
a promising student was later oered a more desirable post or the hospi-
tal could have later hired a better student. Because of these failures these
markets were reorganized by a centralized clearinghouse. Each year rst the
nishing students submit a ranking of the available hospital positions and
the hospitals submit a ranking of the nishing students. Salaries are not
negotiated but included in the job description of an entry-level physician.
Therefore, each participant's preference relation is a ranking of the other
side of the market. Then the centralized clearinghouse matches students
and hospitals on the basis of the submitted lists. Since any rankings could
be submitted, the clearinghouse needs to determine the matching through a
mechanism.
Dierent regions in the U.K. introduced dierent centralized mechanisms
in the late 1960's and the 1970's. The markets in Newcastle, Birmingham,
and Edinburgh adopted priority mechanisms in 1967, and the market in Cam-
bridge and the London Hospital Medical College adopted linear programming
mechanisms in the 1970's. The market in Edinburgh changed the mechanism
in 1969 and based from then on the matching on a stable mechanism called
deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm.
2
In 1971 the market in Cardi also
adopted the DA-algorithm. We will later describe all those mechanisms in
detail. In a centralized market a submitted ranking does not need to reect
the true preference of a participant. In fact students seek for advice of which
list is optimal for them to submit to the clearinghouse.
3
If a student is fully
informed about the rankings the others submitted, then in each of these mar-
kets it might be suboptimal for her to submit the true list. Truthful revelation
of preferences is not a dominant strategy if a student is completely informed.
However, in an entry-level medical market typically a student is not fully
1
See Roth (1991).
2
Roth (1984) showed that the American markets are based on the DA-algorithm.
3
Roth and Rothblum (1999, p. 22).
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informed about the rank-order lists submitted by the other participants. We
will show that the possibilities of strategic manipulation are considerably
limited in a low information environment. We will say that a student's infor-
mation is symmetric for two hospitals if she does not deduce any dierence
between them from her information about the rankings submitted by the
other participants, or equivalently, her belief treats the two hospitals equally.
Our rst result demonstrates that if a student's information is symmetric for
two hospitals, then it is not protable for her to misrepresent her true rank-
ing of those two hospitals. When a student has very little information, then
her belief does not allow her to distinguish between any two hospitals. Our
second result shows that if a student's information is completely symmetric,
then in each of these markets the possibilities of manipulation are very re-
stricted. Then a student might only gain by truncating her true preference.
Such a list leaves the true ranking of the positions unchanged but might drop
some acceptable positions.
We also search for advice of students who do not have completely sym-
metric information. We will show that the Edinburgh 1967 mechanism is
distinguished among the mechanisms introduced in the U.K. medical mar-
kets. In the Edinburgh 1967 market it is never protable for a participant
to rank unacceptable matches as acceptable in the submitted list whereas in
any other British medical market it is possible that only strategies that rank
an unacceptable position as acceptable are optimal for a student.
Our results tell us that we need to be careful when interpreting the con-
clusions by Roth and Rothblum (1999). Their results for markets using
the DA-algorithm follow from our general analysis of all British entry-level
medical markets.
4
In a low information environment our advice for strategic
behavior is identical in all these markets. Therefore, we cannot conclude from
this result that markets using the DA-algorithm perform better than markets
using a priority mechanism. It is even the case that in theory the Edinburgh
priority mechanism performs better than the DA-algorithm because ranking
unacceptable positions as acceptable in the submitted list is not protable
in the Edinburgh 1967 market but in the DA-algorithm it might be optimal
to include unacceptable positions. However, contrary to our conclusions, the
market in Edinburgh abandoned the priority mechanism to adopt the DA-
4
Referring to the DA-algorithm, they write as a conclusion of their results in the Ab-
stract of their paper \This gives some insight into the successful operation of these market
mechanisms."
3
algorithm. Roth (1991) argued that one of the reasons might be that the
DA-algorithm always produces a stable matching for the submitted rank-
ings whereas a priority mechanism does not. However, linear programming
mechanisms also might produce unstable matchings but they are still in use
nowadays.
5
Therefore, why in practice the DA-algorithm performs better
than priority mechanisms still remains an open puzzle.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the centralized matching
market. In Section 3 we present a unifying analysis for advising students with
symmetric information in British entry-level medical markets. In Section 4
we advise students with asymmetric information. Section 5 concludes and
the Appendix contains some denitions and all proofs.
2 The Matching Market
An entry-level medical market consists of a set of new physicians (or students
or interns) who each seek one position at a hospital and a set of hospitals
which would like to employ some number of new physicians. To facilitate the
exposition we will assume that each hospital desires at most one intern. Our
results remain unchanged if we would allow hospitals to hire several appli-
cants. Each hospital's position species the salary for an intern. Since salaries
are not negotiated between an intern and a hospital, an intern's preference
is simply a ranking of the available positions and remaining unemployed.
Given a xed salary, similarly each hospital's preference is a ranking over the
interns and having its position vacant. If the market is organized by a cen-
tralized clearinghouse, then each participant is asked to submit a rank-order
list of the other side of the market (each intern submits a list of hospitals and
each hospital a list of interns) and the clearinghouse determines a matching
between the interns and the hospitals on the basis of the submitted rankings.
Here the clearinghouse needs to be able to specify a matching for any possible
submitted lists. This means that a centralized medical market is based on a
mechanism. Below we formalize the matching market.
Let W denote the set of workers (or interns), F denote the set of rms
(or hospitals), and V  F [W denote the set of participants. Each worker
w 2 W is equipped with a strict preference relation P
w
over F [ fwg and
5
Indeed, a recent laboratory experiment by

Unver (2001) shows that in small labor
markets stability need not be required for the success of a matching mechanism in the
long run.
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each rm f 2 F with a strict preference relation P
f
over W [ ffg. Let P
w
denote the set of all strict preference relations of worker w over F [fwg and
P
f
denote the set of all strict preference relations of rm f over W [ ffg.
Given w 2 W , P
w
2 P
w
, and v; v
0
2 F [ fwg, we write v >
P
w
v
0
if v is
strictly preferred to v
0
under P
w
and v 
P
w
v
0
if v is weakly preferred to v
0
under P
w
. Let A(P
w
) be the set of rms that are acceptable to w under P
w
,
i.e. A(P
w
)  ff 2 F j f >
P
w
wg. Given V
0
 F [ fwg, let P
w
jV
0
denote the
restriction of P
w
to the set V
0
. Given f 2 F and P
f
2 P
f
, we dene >
P
f
,

P
f
, and A(P
f
) analogously. Let P  
v2V
P
v
. Elements of P are called
(preference) proles. Given P 2 P, a matching market is a triplet (F;W; P ).
Because F andW remain xed, a matching market is simply a prole P 2 P.
A matching is a function  : V ! V satisfying the following: (i) for all
w 2 W , (w) 2 F [ fwg; (ii) for all f 2 F , (f) 2 W [ ffg; and (iii) for
all v 2 V , ((v)) = v.
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Given v 2 V , we say that v is unmatched under 
if (v) = v. Let M denote the set of all matchings. A matching is stable
under a given prole if (i) each agent weakly prefers her assignment to being
unmatched and (ii) no pair of a worker and a rm blocks the matching, i.e.
they mutually prefer each other to their assigned partners. Formally, given
P 2 P and  2 M,  is stable under P if (i) for all v 2 V , (v) 2 A(P
v
)[fvg,
and (ii) there exists no pair (w; f) 2 W  F such that f >
P
w
(w) and
w >
P
f
(f). A mechanism is a function M : P ! M. A mechanism M is
stable if for all P 2 P, M [P ] is stable under P .
Given v 2 W and P
v
2 P
v
, we call P
v
jA(P
v
) a rank-order list of v. For a
physician a rank-order list is a ranking of all positions which are acceptable
for her and for a hospital a rank-order list is a ranking of all physicians which
are acceptable for it. The U.K. markets ask participants to submit only rank-
order lists, i.e. they do not need to specify the ranking of the unacceptable
matches. This means that the mechanisms they use are independent of the
ranking of the unacceptable matches.
6
All our results remain unchanged if some rms have more than one position available.
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3 Advising Physicians with Symmetric Infor-
mation
3.1 Symmetric Information
If a physician is fully informed about the rankings which the other agents sub-
mitted to the clearinghouse, then in each of the U.K. markets she might gain
by lying instead of submitting her true ranking. Typically in the matching
markets considered here, a physician is unaware of the rankings submitted
by the others. Therefore, it is important to consider physicians having in-
complete information. A physician's uncertainty is expressed by a belief (or
random preference prole) associating a probability with each possible sub-
mitted lists. This in turn induces a probability distribution over all match-
ings for any ranking the physician reports. The probability of a matching is
simply given by the sum of the probabilities of the others' possible submit-
ted lists for which the mechanism yields that matching. We compare these
probability distributions through rst-order stochastic dominance of a par-
ticipant's true preference relation. That is, a physician prefers submitting
list 1 to submitting list 2 if and only if the distribution induced from list
1 stochastically dominates in terms of her true ranking the distribution in-
duced from list 2. The physician then prefers list 1 to list 2 for any utility
function representing her true preference. Below we incorporate physicians
with incomplete information.
Given w 2 W , let P
 w
 
v2V nfwg
P
v
. A random preference prole is
a probability distribution
~
P
 w
over P
 w
. We interpret
~
P
 w
as w's belief
(or w's information) about the stated preferences of the other players, i.e.
their rankings submitted to the clearinghouse.
7
A random matching ~m is a
probability distribution over the set of matchings M. Let ~m(w) denote the
distribution which ~m induces over w's set of assignments F [ fwg. Given
a mechanism M and P
w
2 P
w
, each randomized preference prole
~
P
 w
in-
duces a random matching M [P
w
;
~
P
 w
] in the following way: for all  2 M,
PrfM [P
w
;
~
P
 w
] = g = Prf
~
P
 w
= P
 w
& M [P
w
; P
 w
] = g. Note that
7
We could also interpret
~
P
 w
as w's belief about the true preferences of the other
players. Then w needs to take into account for any prole the strategy any participant
is playing. Here we could also allow for mixed strategies. Now obviously
~
P
 w
and the
(mixed) strategies of the other players induce a belief over the submitted rankings. Our
results then hold for any belief about others' true preferences and any strategies which
induce a symmetric information over the submitted rankings.
6
M [P
w
;
~
P
 w
](w) is the distribution which M [P
w
;
~
P
 w
] induces over w's set of
assignments. Given w 2 W , P
w
; P
0
w
; P
00
w
2 P
w
, and a random preference pro-
le
~
P
 w
, we say that strategy P
0
w
stochastically P
w
-dominates the strategy
P
00
w
, denoted by M [P
0
w
;
~
P
 w
](w) m
P
w
M [P
00
w
;
~
P
 w
](w), if for all v 2 F [ fwg,
PrfM [P
0
w
;
~
P
 w
](w) 
P
w
vg  PrfM [P
00
w
;
~
P
 w
](w) 
P
w
vg.
In a medical market a student is often not able to distinguish between two
hospitals. In other words she regards them to be symmetric. Obviously this
symmetry should be reected in her belief. Following Roth and Rothblum
(1999) we will say that her information is symmetric for two hospitals if
she assigns the same probability to any submitted prole and its symmetric
prole where the roles of those two hospitals are interchanged.
Given w 2 W , P
w
2 P
w
, and f; f
0
2 F , let P
f$f
0
w
denote the list which
exchanges the positions of f and f
0
in P
w
and leaves the other positions in
P
w
unchanged. For example, if P
w
: f
1
f
4
f
2
f
3
, then P
f
3
$f
4
w
: f
1
f
3
f
2
f
4
. Given
P
 w
2 P
 w
, under P
f$f
0
 w
each worker in Wnfwg exchanges the positions of
f and f
0
in her preference list, rms f and f
0
exchange their preferences (P
f
0
becomes the preference of f in P
f$f
0
 w
and P
f
the preference of f
0
in P
f$f
0
 w
),
and the preferences of the other rms remain unchanged.
8
Given w 2 W and f; f
0
2 F , worker w's information
~
P
 w
is ff; f
0
g-
symmetric if the distributions of
~
P
 w
and
~
P
f$f
0
 w
coincide, i.e. for every
prole P
 w
, Prf
~
P
 w
= P
 w
g = Prf
~
P
f$f
0
 w
= P
 w
g, or equivalently P
 w
and P
f$f
0
 w
are equally probable under
~
P
 w
. Worker w's information
~
P
 w
is
F -symmetric if
~
P
 w
is symmetric for any two rms belonging to F , i.e.
~
P
 w
is ff; f
0
g-symmetric for all f; f
0
2 F .
3.2 A Unifying Analysis
In this subsection we provide a unifying analysis in advising students with
symmetric information in the U.K. markets. First we will identify several
basic properties of mechanisms. Then we will give two general theorems
which apply to any market using a mechanism satisfying these properties.
Later we will show that any of the U.K. mechanisms satises these properties.
One of the common features of the U.K. markets is that they treat partic-
ipants on each side of the market symmetrically. This is very natural because
8
Formally, let P
f$f
0
 w
denote the prole P
0
 w
2 P
 w
such that for all w
0
2 Wnfwg,
P
0
w
0
= P
f$f
0
w
0
, for all f
00
2 Fnff; f
0
g, P
0
f
00
= P
f
00
, P
0
f
jW = P
f
0
jW and A(P
0
f
) = A(P
f
0
),
and P
0
f
0
jW = P
f
jW and A(P
0
f
0
) = A(P
f
).
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we do not want to discriminate between two hospitals since they belong to
the same side of the market and have a priori the same rights of hiring any
student. As we will show, another common feature of the U.K. markets is
the following: suppose that the participants submitted rank-order lists and
an intern is matched to the hospital at Oxford University. Then it is natural
to require that when she improves in her submitted list the ranking of the
hospital at Oxford University by exchanging its position with the position
of a hospital which she formally declared to be preferred to the hospital at
Oxford University, then she should remain matched to the hospital at Oxford
University. This requirement also excludes the possibility for her to gain by
such a simple manipulation. We will call this property \positive association".
We only require anonymity of the mechanism for the rms. Given a
matching  2 M and f; f
0
2 F , let 
f$f
0
denote the matching such that for
all w 2 W , (i) if (w) =2 ff; f
0
g, then 
f$f
0
(w) = (w), (ii) if (w) = f ,
then 
f$f
0
(w) = f
0
, and (iii) if (w) = f
0
, then 
f$f
0
(w) = f .
Anonymity: For all P 2 P, all  2 M, and all f; f
0
2 F , if M [P ] = ,
then M [P
f$f
0
] = 
f$f
0
.
The next requirement says that given a prole, if a worker improves the
ranking of the rm she is matched to by switching it with a rm which is
ranked above the rm she is matched to, then her assignment remains un-
changed under the new prole.
Positive Association: For all P 2 P, all w 2 W , and all f; f
0
2 F , if
M [P ](w) = f and f
0
>
P
w
f , then M [P
f$f
0
w
; P
 w
](w) = f .
These two common properties of the U.K. markets allow us to give a rst
advice to participants with symmetric information: if an intern's information
is symmetric for two positions, then it is never benecial for her to reverse
the true ranking of those two positions in her submitted rank-order list.
Of course, it is possible that she could gain by another more complicated
misrepresentation.
Theorem 1 In a matching market which uses an anonymous mechanism
satisfying positive association, any strategy which reverses the true ranking
of f and f
0
is stochastically dominated by a strategy which preserves the true
ranking of f and f
0
for a worker with ff; f
0
g-symmetric information.
8
The advice in Theorem 1 is restricted to two positions. In a low informa-
tion environment an intern is not able to deduce which rank-order lists were
submitted by which participant. Then an intern's information is symmetric
for any two hospitals. To be able to specify an advice we need to identify
two other common features of the U.K. markets. In these markets we do not
want an intern to be assigned a position which is less preferred for her than
being unemployed. If this would be the case, then she would immediately
withdraw from the position. We will call this weak \stability" condition in-
dividual rationality. Another property which is common to the centralized
mechanisms in the U.K. markets is that the matching is independent of the
position where being unemployed is ranked: suppose that an intern submit-
ted a rank-order list and is matched to the hospital at Cambridge University.
Then if she would have dropped some less preferred hospitals from her sub-
mitted rank-order list but kept the ranking of the hospitals unchanged, then
she remains matched to the hospital at Cambridge University. We will call
this condition \independence of truncations".
Individual Rationality: For all P 2 P and all v 2 V , M [P ](v) 
P
v
v.
A truncation strategy is a preference relation which ranks the rms in the
same way as the true preference relation and each rm which is acceptable
under the truncation strategy is also acceptable under the true preference
relation. Formally, given w 2 W and P
w
2 P
w
, a strategy P
0
w
2 P
w
is a
truncation strategy of P
w
if (i) P
0
w
jF = P
w
jF and (ii) A(P
0
w
)  A(P
w
).
9
If a worker truncates her preference in a way such that the rm she is
matched to remains acceptable under the truncated preference, then inde-
pendence of truncations requires that her assignment is the same under both
proles.
Independence of Truncations: For all P 2 P, all w 2 W , and all
P
0
w
2 P
w
, if P
0
w
is a truncation of P
w
and M [P ](w) is acceptable under
P
0
w
, then M [P
0
w
; P
 w
](w) = M [P ](w).
9
Roth and Rothblum (1999) allow a truncation strategy to rank its unacceptable rms
dierently than the true ranking. This dierence in our denition of a truncation strategy
and Roth and Rothblum's denition is irrelevant because in the U.K. markets the partic-
ipants do not need to specify the ranking over the unacceptable matches. They are asked
to submit rank-order lists only.
9
Our main theorem advises students with completely symmetric informa-
tion. The possibilities of manipulation of such a student are considerably
reduced. We show that any strategy which changes the true ranking of any
two positions and/or adds unacceptable positions is suboptimal for her. The
optimal strategic behavior for a student with F -symmetric information is to
submit a list which leaves the true ranking of the hospitals unchanged and
which does not rank any unacceptable hospital as acceptable.
Theorem 2 In a matching market which uses an anonymous mechanism
satisfying positive association, individual rationality, and independence of
truncations, any non-truncation strategy is stochastically dominated by a
truncation of the true preferences for a worker with F -symmetric informa-
tion.
3.3 The Mechanisms in the U.K. Markets
3.3.1 Priority Mechanisms
Priority mechanisms were adopted by the entry-level medical markets in
Birmingham in 1966, in Edinburgh in 1967, and in Newcastle in 1967. Such
a mechanism orders all possible student-hospital matches according to the
rank of a hospital in a student's preference relation and the rank of a student
in a hospital's preference relation. First priority is always given to a (1,1)
match, then to (1,2) or (2,1) and so on. If two matches have one rank in
common, then the pair for which the other rank is smaller has higher priority.
For example, a (3,5) match always has higher priority than a (3,6) match and
a (4,5) match.
A priority mechanism matches for each prole sequentially all student-
hospital pairs which have the highest priority among all remaining pairs.
First the priority mechanism checks whether there are (1,1) matches. If
there are any (1,1) matches (i.e. a student-hospital pair who mutually rank
each other rst), then they are realized. Second the priority mechanism
checks whether there are matches who have the second highest priority ((1,2)
or (2,1)) and matches any such pair. And so on. All these matches are
made only if the student-hospital pair mutually prefers each other to being
unmatched (i.e. subject to individual rationality).
The markets using priority mechanisms dier in how they ordered matches.
Both the Newcastle and the Birmingham market used as a basis the product
10
of the hospital's rank of the student and the student's rank of the hospital.
If two matches yield the same product, then in Birmingham the tie is broken
in favor of the hospital, so that a (2,1) match would have higher priority
than a (1,2) match and a (6,1) match would have higher priority than a (2,3)
match. In Newcastle ties are broken in favor of the student.
In Edinburgh matches were ordered lexicographically in hospitals' prefer-
ences. That is, (1,1) matches have rst priority, followed by (2,1), (3,1), and
so on. Only when all hospitals' rst choices are exhausted, other matches
((1,2), (2,2), (3,2),: : : ) are considered. We will call the Edinburgh mechanism
a lexicographic priority mechanism.
Any priority mechanism is unstable, i.e. for some proles it chooses
a matching which is not stable under the announced prole (Roth, 1991,
Proposition 10).
As we will show, priority mechanisms satisfy anonymity, positive associ-
ation, individual rationality, and independence of truncations. Therefore, by
Theorem 2, in these medical markets a physician with completely symmetric
information cannot do better than submitting a truncation of her true list.
Corollary 1 In a matching market which uses a priority mechanism, any
non-truncation strategy is stochastically dominated by a truncation of the true
preferences for a worker with F -symmetric information.
In any of the U.K. markets using a priority mechanism it might be optimal
for a physician with completely symmetric information to submit a truncation
of her true preference instead of her true list. The example also establishes
that if a worker is completely informed, then truthful revelation might be
suboptimal.
10
Example 1 Let W = fw
1
; w
2
; w
3
g and F = ff
1
; f
2
g. Let M be a priority
mechanism giving higher priority to (2; 1) matches than to (1; 3) matches.
Let P
 w
1
be such that (for each agent we only specify the ranking over the
acceptable matches)
P
w
2
P
w
3
P
f
1
P
f
2
f
2
f
2
w
2
w
1
w
3
w
1
P
f
1
$f
2
w
2
P
f
1
$f
2
w
3
P
f
1
$f
2
f
1
P
f
1
$f
2
f
2
f
1
f
1
w
1
w
2
w
3
w
1
10
This is also shown in Proposition 5 by Roth (1991).
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Let w
1
's information
~
P
 w
1
be such that Prf
~
P
 w
1
= P
 w
1
g = Prf
~
P
 w
1
=
P
f
1
$f
2
 w
1
g =
1
2
. Then worker w
1
's information is F -symmetric. Let P
w
1
:
f
1
; f
2
; w
1
be w
1
's true preference. We show that it is optimal for w
1
to
submit P
0
w
1
: f
1
; w
1
; f
2
. Under P , there are no (1,1) and (1,2) matches. Then
(w
1
; f
2
) is a (2,1) match and (w
1
; f
1
) is a (1,3) match. Because (2; 1) matches
have higher priority than (1,3) matches, we have M [P ](w
1
) = f
2
. Under
[P
w
1
; P
f
1
$f
2
 w
1
], (w
1
; f
1
) is a (1,1) match and we have M [P
w
1
; P
f
1
$f
2
 w
1
](w
1
) = f
1
.
Thus, if w
1
submits P
w
1
, then w
1
is matched with probability
1
2
to f
1
and
with probability
1
2
to f
2
.
Under [P
0
w
1
; P
 w
1
], there are no (1,1), (1,2) and (2,1) matches. Then
(w
1
; f
1
) is a (1,3) match and M [P
w
1
; P
 w
1
](w
1
) = f
1
. Similarly as above,
M [P
0
w
1
; P
f
1
$f
2
 w
1
](w
1
) = f
1
. Thus, if w
1
submits P
0
w
1
, then w
1
is matched with
probability 1 to f
1
{ an improvement over truthful revelation. 
3.3.2 Linear Programming Mechanisms
Linear programming mechanisms were introduced in the entry level medical
markets in the London Hospital Medical College in 1973 and in Cambridge
in 1978. Such a mechanism assigns to each student-hospital match a weight
with respect to the submitted rank-order lists. These weights are decreasing,
i.e. (1,1) matches have greatest weight, then (1,2) and (2,1) matches, and so
on. For any submitted rankings, the mechanism calculates a score through
these weights for each individually rational matching and chooses one with
maximal score. When there are several individually rational matchings which
maximize the score, then tie breaking is necessary. We will assume that in
such a case, the linear programming mechanism chooses each matching with
maximal score with equal probability.
11
If for any submitted lists there is a
unique matching with maximal score, then the problem of tie breaking can
be ignored.
In the London Hospital Medical College choices 1, 2, 3, and 4 are given
weights 20, 14, 9, and 5, respectively (Shah and Farrow, 1974). Then (1,1)
matches have weight 20+ 20 = 40, (1,2) and (2,1) matches weight 14+ 20 =
34, (1,3) and (3,1) matches weight 9 + 20 = 29, and (1,4) and (4,1) matches
weight 5 + 20 = 25. The linear programming mechanism used in Cambridge
assigns to matches (1,1), (2,1), (3,1), (1,2), (2,2), (3,2), and (1,3) the weights
8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, and 2, respectively.
11
Due to this problem of tie breaking, Appendix C will extend our analysis to mecha-
nisms choosing a lottery for each prole.
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Any linear programming mechanism is unstable, i.e. for some proles it
chooses a matching which is not stable under the announced prole (Roth,
1991, Proposition 8). Such a mechanism even may fail to make (1,1)-matches,
i.e. there are situations in which a student-hospital pair mutually prefers each
other most but they are not matched to each other by the linear programming
mechanism. Nevertheless linear programming mechanisms are still in use
nowadays.
Using Theorem 2 we show that in these markets a student with completely
symmetric information cannot do better than by submitting a truncation of
her true preference list.
Corollary 2 In a matching market which uses a linear programming mecha-
nism, any non-truncation strategy is stochastically dominated by a truncation
of the true preferences for a worker with F -symmetric information.
Using Example 1 it can also be shown that for a student with completely
symmetric information submitting a truncation might be better than sub-
mitting the true list in the London market and the Cambridge market.
3.3.3 The DA-algorithm
In entry-level medical markets interns and hospitals can dissolve a match and
recontract. Therefore, it has been argued that mechanisms which produce
unstable matchings may fail and should be replaced by stable ones. Indeed,
in Edinburgh the lexicographic priority mechanism was replaced by a stable
mechanism in 1969. The market in Cardi also adopted a stable mechanism
in 1971. Both markets introduced the most prominent stable mechanism
which is used in centralized entry-level labor markets: the hospital-proposing
deferred-acceptance algorithm (Gale and Shapley, 1962). We refer to the
algorithm as the DA-algorithm.
The (hospital-proposing) DA-algorithm, denoted by DA.
STEP 1: Each hospital proposes to its favorite student. Each student rejects
the proposal of any hospital that is unacceptable to her, and each student
who receives more than one acceptable proposal rejects all but her most
preferred among these, which she holds.
STEP k: Each hospital whose proposal was rejected at the previous step
proposes to its favorite student among those who are acceptable for it and
13
who did not reject it at a previous step. Each student who receives proposals
rejects all but her most preferred acceptable oer among those who propose
to it and the proposal she held (if any).
STOP: The DA-algorithm terminates at a step at when each hospital which
was rejected at the previous step has proposed to all its acceptable stu-
dents. The outcome of the algorithm is the matching at which each student
is matched to the hospital she is holding when the algorithm stops. Workers
who did not receive any proposal and hospitals which were rejected by all
students acceptable to them, remain unmatched. We denote by DA[P ] the
matching that the DA-algorithm yields when applied to prole P . 
Under complete information truthful revelation of preferences is a domi-
nant strategy for hospitals whereas a student might prot by misrepresenting
her true ranking (Roth, 1982). Under incomplete information each hospital
can still do no better than submitting its true ranking to the DA-algorithm
(Roth, 1989). Until Roth and Rothblum (1999) there was no advice when
participants are not fully informed. Their main results follow from our uni-
fying analysis of the U.K. markets.
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We will show that the DA-algorithm is
just another mechanism satisfying the properties of Theorem 2.
Corollary 3 (Roth and Rothblum, 1999, Theorem 2) In a matching
market which uses the DA-algorithm, any non-truncation strategy is stochas-
tically dominated by a truncation of the true preferences for a worker with
F -symmetric information.
Again it might be better for a student with completely symmetric infor-
mation to submit a truncation instead of her true list.
13
4 Advising Physicians with Asymmetric In-
formation
A student's information does not need to be symmetric for all hospitals. If
this is the case, then Theorem 2 does not give any advice to such a par-
12
Note that Roth and Rothblum (1999, Theorem 1) follows from Theorem 1.
13
This can also be seen from Example 5 below when w
1
believes each P
 w
1
and P
f
1
$f
2
 w
1
with probability
1
2
and her true preference is P
w
1
: f
1
; f
2
; w
1
. When submitting P
w
1
, she
is matched with probability
1
2
to f
1
and with probability
1
2
to f
2
. When she submits
P
0
w
1
: f
1
; w
1
; f
2
, she is matched with probability 1 to f
1
, an improvement.
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ticipant. We investigate whether a participant is able to gain by ranking
unacceptable matches as acceptable. If the clearinghouse is not able to elicit
true preferences (as it is the case in any British medical market), then we
would like to design at least a mechanism under which each participant sub-
mits a list ranking only matches as acceptable which are also acceptable
under the true preference. Of course, by Example 1, it might be optimal to
drop acceptable matches.
In the Edinburgh 1967 market we advise each participant not to include
any unacceptable match in the submitted rank-order list. For a lexicographic
priority mechanism it is suboptimal for a physician to add unacceptable posi-
tions to her submitted rank-order list and for a hospital to add unacceptable
students to its submitted rank-order list.
Theorem 3 In a matching market using a lexicographic priority mechanism,
(i) any strategy which lists an unacceptable rm as acceptable is stochasti-
cally dominated by a strategy which does not list any unacceptable rm
as acceptable for any worker; and
(ii) any strategy which lists an unacceptable worker as acceptable is stochas-
tically dominated by a strategy which does not list any unacceptable
worker as acceptable for any rm.
Any further advice would depend on \how" symmetric a physician's in-
formation is. If her information is symmetric for a subset of hospitals, then
through Theorem 1 it follows that she should truthfully reveal her preference
restricted to this set.
Unfortunately Theorem 3 does not carry over to any other entry-level
medical market in the U.K.. In any other market (i.e. the Birmingham 1966
market, the Newcastle 1967 market, the London 1973 market, the Cambridge
1978 market, and the markets using the DA-algorithm) it might happen that
only strategies which rank unacceptable positions as acceptable are optimal
for a physician. The Appendix provides examples establishing this claim.
5 Conclusion
Our advice of strategic behavior for students with symmetric information is
identical in all British entry-level medical markets (Theorem 1 and Theorem
15
2). If a student's information is completely symmetric, then it is optimal
for her to submit a truncation of her true preference. Such a list leaves the
true ranking of the positions unchanged and does not rank any unacceptable
position as acceptable. In each market it is possible that a student prots
from dropping acceptable positions from her true rank-order list.
When considering participants with asymmetric information, the Edin-
burgh 1967 market is distinguished among the British medical markets: it
is the only market in which for both sides (students and hospitals) it is sub-
optimal to include unacceptable matches in their rank-order lists. This is
surprising because the Edinburgh market abandoned the priority mechanism
and adopted the DA-algorithm in 1969. In the Birmingham 1966 market
and the Newcastle 1967 market students and hospitals were again early con-
tracting and submitted a list containing just the pre-arranged partner.
1415
However, any mechanism discussed in this paper realizes the match of a stu-
dent and a hospital who submitted rank-order lists containing mutually each
other as the only acceptable match. Therefore, this kind of pre-arrangement
is possible in any British entry-level medical market. It is still puzzling why
in the markets using linear programming mechanisms or the DA-algorithm
pre-contracting is less observed.
14
This behavior has been duplicated by Kagel and Roth (2000) in a laboratory exper-
iment for the Newcastle 1967 market. However, to my knowledge it is not clear why the
Edinburgh market abandoned its priority mechanism.
15
When a hospital is allowed to hire several students and information is complete,
Sonmez (1999) shows that no stable mechanism is immune to pre-arranged matches.
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APPENDIX.
The Appendix contains all the proofs.
A Proofs of Subsection 3.2
Theorem 1 is a consequence of the following result.
Theorem 4 Let M be an anonymous mechanism satisfying positive asso-
ciation. Let w 2 W , f; f
0
2 F , and
~
P
 w
be a ff; f
0
g-symmetric random
preference prole. Let P
w
;

P
w
2 P
w
be such that f >
P
w
f
0
and f >

P
w
f
0
.
Then we have M [

P
w
;
~
P
 w
](w)m
P
w
M [

P
f$f
0
w
;
~
P
 w
](w).
Proof. Let v 2 F [ fwg be such that v =2 ff; f
0
g. For all

P
 w
2 P
 w
, by
anonymity, M [

P ](w) = v if and only if M [

P
f$f
0
](w) = v. Because

P
 w
and

P
f$f
0
 w
are equally probable under
~
P
 w
, it follows that
PrfM [

P
w
;
~
P
 w
](w) = vg = PrfM [

P
f$f
0
w
;
~
P
 w
](w) = vg: (1)
Let

P
 w
2 P
 w
. IfM [

P ](w) = f
0
, then by f >

P
w
f
0
and positive association,
M [

P
f$f
0
w
;

P
 w
](w) = f
0
. Thus,
PrfM [

P
w
;
~
P
 w
](w) = f
0
g  PrfM [

P
f$f
0
w
;
~
P
 w
](w) = f
0
g: (2)
Hence, by (1) and (2) and since f >
P
w
f
0
and M [P
w
;
~
P
 w
](w) is a probabil-
ity distribution, we have M [

P
w
;
~
P
 w
](w)m
P
w
M [

P
f$f
0
w
;
~
P
 w
](w), the desired
conclusion. 
Proof of Theorem 2. Let M be an anonymous mechanism satisfying
positive association, individual rationality, and independence of truncations.
Let w 2 W , P
w
2 P
w
, and
~
P
 w
be a F -symmetric random preference prole.
Without loss of generality, suppose that F = ff
1
; : : : ; f
jF j
g and f
1
>
P
w
f
2
>
P
w
   >
P
w
f
jF j
. Let

P
w
2 P
w
be a strategy.
Let
^
P
w
2 P
w
be such that
^
P
w
jF = P
w
jF and jA(
^
P
w
)j = jA(

P
w
)j. First
we show that
^
P
w
stochastically P
w
-dominates

P
w
.
Let  : f1; : : : ; jF jg ! f1; : : : ; jF jg be the mapping such that f
(1)
>

P
w
f
(2)
>

P
w
   >

P
w
f
(jF j)
. If

P
w
jF 6= P
w
jF , then there exist i; i + j 2
f1; : : : ; jF jg such that (i)  i+j, (i+j)  i, and for all l 2 fi+1; : : : ; i+j 
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1g, (l) = l. Therefore, f
(i+j)
>
P
w
f
(i)
and f
(i)
>

P
w
f
(i+j)
. Then it follows
from (1) in the proof of Theorem 1 that for all v 2 (F [fwg)nff
(i)
; f
(i+j)
g,
PrfM [

P
f
(i)
$f
(i+j)
w
;
~
P
 w
](w) = vg = PrfM [

P
w
;
~
P
 w
](w) = vg and from (2)
in the proof of Theorem 1 that PrfM [

P
f
(i)
$f
(i+j)
w
;
~
P
 w
](w) = f
(i+j)
g 
PrfM [

P
w
;
~
P
 w
](w) = f
(i+j)
g. Hence, by f
(i+j)
>
P
w
f
(i)
,
M [

P
f
(i)
$f
(i+j)
w
;
~
P
 w
](w)m
P
w
M [

P
w
;
~
P
 w
](w):
Applying the above argument inductively (note that the above construc-
tion (i) does not switch rms which are already at the \right" position under
^
P
w
and

P
w
, i.e. if (l) = l, then f
l
is not involved in any exchange of po-
sitions and (ii) switches two rms only if the preferences are reversed under
P
w
and

P
w
) it follows from transitivity of m
P
w
that
M [
^
P
w
;
~
P
 w
](w)m
P
w
M [

P
w
;
~
P
 w
](w): (3)
If A(
^
P
w
)  A(P
w
), then
^
P
w
is a truncation of P
w
which stochastically P
w
-
dominates

P
w
, the desired conclusion. Otherwise, if A(
^
P
w
) ) A(P
w
), then
by
^
P
w
jF = P
w
jF and independence of truncations, for all f 2 A(P
w
) and
all P
 w
2 P
 w
, if M [
^
P
w
; P
 w
](w) = f , then M [P ](w) = f . Thus, for all
f 2 A(P
w
), PrfM [P
w
;
~
P
 w
](w) = fg  PrfM [
^
P
w
;
~
P
 w
](w) = fg. Because
M is individually rational, it follows thatM [P
w
;
~
P
 w
](w)m
P
w
M [
^
P
w
;
~
P
 w
](w).
Hence, by transitivity of m
P
w
and (3), M [P
w
;
~
P
 w
](w) m
P
w
M [

P
w
;
~
P
 w
](w).
Thus, P
w
is a truncation of P
w
which stochastically P
w
-dominates

P
w
, the
desired conclusion. 
B Priority Mechanisms
First we dene priority mechanisms formally. Second we establish Corollary 1
by showing that any priority mechanism satises the properties of Theorem
2. Third we prove Theorem 3 by showing that in a lexicographic priority
mechanism no participant benets from including unacceptable matches in
her submitted rank-order list. Fourth we provide a example to demonstrate
that this conclusion is false for the priority mechanisms which were used in
Birmingham and Newcastle.
Given P
w
2 P
w
and f 2 F , we will denote by rank(f; P
w
) the rank of f
in P
w
. Similarly we dene rank(w; P
f
). Given a prole P , we call (w; f) a
(a; b) match if rank(f; P
w
) = a and rank(w; P
f
) = b.
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A priority function is a one-to-one mapping g : N  N ! N such that
(i) for all (a; b); (a
0
; b) 2 N  N , if a < a
0
, then g(a; b) < g(a
0
; b), and (ii) for
all (a; b); (a; b
0
) 2 N  N , if b < b
0
, then g(a; b) < g(a; b
0
). For each prole
the priority mechanism based on g matches sequentially all worker-rm pairs
which have the highest priority according to g subject to individual rational-
ity. Let M
g
denote the priority mechanism based on g.
Proof of Corollary 1. LetM
g
be a priority mechanism with priority func-
tion g. It suces to show that M
g
is a mechanism satisfying the properties
of Theorem 2. It is obvious that M
g
is anonymous and individually rational.
In showing positive association, let w 2 W and P 2 P. LetM
g
[P ](w) = f
and f
0
2 F be such that f
0
>
P
w
f . Under [P
f$f
0
w
; P
 w
], each pair (f
00
; w) with
f
00
2 Fnffg has at most the same priority as under P . Under [P
f$f
0
w
; P
 w
]
only the pair (f; w) has higher priority than under P . Thus, M
g
[P ](w) = f
implies M
g
[P
f$f
0
w
; P
 w
](w) = f .
In showing independence of truncations, let w 2 W and P 2 P. Let
M
g
[P ](w) = f and P
0
w
2 P
w
be such that P
0
w
jF = P
w
jF and f 2 A(P
0
w
) 
A(P
w
). Then under [P
0
w
; P
 w
] each pair (f
00
; w) with f
00
2 A(P
0
w
) has the same
priority as under P . Thus, M
g
[P ](w) = f impliesM
g
[P
f$f
0
w
; P
 w
](w) = f . 
Proof of Theorem 3. Let M
g
be a lexicographic priority mechanism.
Because of the symmetry of the matching market, it suces to show (i)
for the F -lexicographic priority mechanism and the W -lexicographic priority
mechanism.
(i) for F -lexicographic priority function: Let g be the F -lexicographic
priority function, i.e. for all (a; b); (a
0
; b
0
) 2 N  N, if b < b
0
, then g(a; b) <
g(a
0
; b
0
).
Let w 2 W and
~
P
 w
be w's belief about the rank-order lists submitted
by the other participants. Let

P
w
2 P
w
be w's true preference and P
w
2 P
w
be a strategy. Let P
0
w
2 P
w
be such that A(P
0
w
) = A(

P
w
) \ A(P
w
) and
P
0
w
jA(P
0
w
) = P
w
jA(P
0
w
). We show that P
0
w
stochastically

P
w
-dominates P
w
.
Let f 2 A(P
0
w
) and P
 w
2 P
 w
be such that M
g
[P ](w) = f . Since g is
F -lexicographic and the preferences of the others remain unchanged, we have
M
g
[P
0
w
; P
 w
](w) 6= w. Let M
g
[P
0
w
; P
 w
](w) = f
0
. If (w; f) is an (a; b) match
under P , then by P
0
w
jA(P
0
w
) = P
w
jA(P
0
w
) and A(P
0
w
)  A(P
w
), (w; f) has
at least priority g(a; b) under [P
0
w
; P
 w
]. Consider the sequence of matches
realized byM
g
at P and realized byM
g
at [P
0
w
; P
 w
]. Because the preferences
of the other participants are identical, the sequence of matches is identical
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until w is matched at P or at [P
0
w
; P
 w
].
If f
0
6= f , then by M
g
[P ](w) = f and because g is F -lexicographic and
(w; f) has at least priority g(a; b) under [P
0
w
; P
 w
], we must have that w is
matched earlier at [P
0
w
; P
 w
] than at P . This is only possible if rank(w; P
f
0
) <
rank(w; P
f
) = b. But then the match (w; f
0
) has also higher priority than
(w; f) under P , which contradicts M
g
[P ](w) = f . Thus, M
g
[P
0
w
; P
 w
](w) =
f and PrfM
g
[P
0
w
; P
 w
](w) = fg  PrfM
g
[P ](w) = fg. Because A(P
0
w
) 
A(

P
w
) andM
g
is individually rational, we haveM
g
[P
0
w
;
~
P
 w
](w)m

P
w
M
g
[P
w
;
~
P
 w
](w),
the desired conclusion.
(i) for W -lexicographic priority function: Let g be the W -lexicographic
priority function, i.e. for all (a; b); (a
0
; b
0
) 2 N  N , if a < a
0
, then g(a; b) <
g(a
0
; b
0
).
Let w 2 W and
~
P
 w
be w's belief about the rank-order lists submitted
by the other participants. Let

P
w
2 P
w
be w's true preference and P
w
2 P
w
be a strategy. Suppose P
w
ranks an unacceptable rm above an acceptable
rm in A(P
w
). Let f 2 A(P
0
w
) \ A(

P
w
) and f
0
2 A(P
0
w
)nA(

P
w
) be such that
f
0
>
P
w
f . Without loss of generality, we suppose that f
0
is the P
w
most
preferred unacceptable rm and f is the

P
w
most preferred acceptable rm
which is ranked acceptable and below f
0
under P
w
.
Let f
00
2 F be such that f
00
>
P
w
f
0
. Because g is W -lexicographic, we
have for all P
 w
2 P
 w
, M
g
[P ](w) = f
00
,M
g
[P
f$f
0
w
; P
 w
](w) = f
00
. Thus,
for all f
00
2 F such that f
00
>
P
w
f
0
,
PrfM
g
[P
f$f
0
w
;
~
P
 w
](w) = f
00
g = PrfM
g
[P
w
;
~
P
 w
](w) = f
00
g: (4)
Let f
00
2 Fnffg be such that f
0
>
P
w
f
00
. Because g is W -lexicographic, we
have for all P
 w
2 P
 w
, if M
g
[P ](w) = f
00
, then the match (w; f
00
) has the
same priority under [P
f$f
0
w
; P
 w
]. Because (w; f) is the only match which has
higher priority under [P
f$f
0
w
; P
 w
] than under P , we haveM
g
[P
f$f
0
w
; P
 w
](w) 2
ff
00
; fg. Thus, for all f
00
2 F 2 ffg such that f
0
>
P
w
f
00
,
fP
 w
2 P
 w
jM
g
[P ](w) = f
00
g 
fP
 w
2 P
 w
jM
g
[P
f$f
0
w
; P
 w
](w) = f
00
or M
g
[P
f$f
0
w
; P
 w
](w) = fg: (5)
Because priority mechanisms satisfy positive association, we also have
fP
 w
2 P
 w
jM
g
[P ](w) = fg  fP
 w
2 P
 w
jM
g
[P
f$f
0
w
; P
 w
](w) = fg:
(6)
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Now observe from (4), (5), and (6) that for each rm which is acceptable
under

P
w
and P
w
the probability does not decrease when submitting P
f$f
0
w
instead of P
w
or if it decreases for f
00
, then by our choice of f , f >

P
w
f
00
, and
by (5), all the lost probability is put on the more preferred rm f .
If there is again an unacceptable rm which is ranked above an acceptable
rm under P
f$f
0
w
, then we derive the same conclusions. After a nite number
of switches we will arrive at a strategy P
0
w
2 P
w
such that A(P
0
w
) = A(P
w
)
and for all f 2 A(P
0
w
) \ A(

P
w
) and all f
0
2 A(P
0
w
)nA(

P
w
), f >
P
0
w
f
0
.
The following strategy drops the unacceptable rms from the list P
0
w
.
Let P
00
w
2 P
w
be such that A(P
00
w
) = A(P
0
w
) \ A(

P
w
) and P
00
w
jA(P
00
w
) =
P
0
w
jA(P
00
w
). Because M
g
satises individual rationality and independence of
truncations, similarly to the proof of Theorem 2 we haveM
g
[P
00
w
;
~
P
 w
](w)m

P
w
M
g
[P
0
w
;
~
P
 w
](w).
Since (4), (5), and (6) hold at each switch from P
w
to P
0
w
, it follows that
P
00
w
stochastically

P
w
-dominates P
w
and P
00
w
does not rank any unacceptable
rm as acceptable, the desired conclusion. 
The following example shows that in both the Birmingham 1966 market
and the Newcastle 1967 market it is possible that only strategies which rank
unacceptable positions as acceptable are optimal for a physician.
Example 2 Let W = fw
1
; w
2
; w
3
g and F = ff
1
; f
2
; f
3
; f
4
g. Let M be a
priority mechanism which gives higher priority to (2; 1) matches than to
(1; 3) matches and which gives higher priority to (1; 3) matches than to (4; 1)
matches. Let P
 w
1
and
^
P
 w
1
be such that (for each agent we only specify
the ranking over the acceptable matches)
P
w
2
P
w
3
P
f
1
P
f
2
P
f
3
P
f
4
f
2
f
2
w
2
w
1
w
2
w
2
w
3
w
3
w
3
w
1
P
f
1
$f
2
w
2
P
f
1
$f
2
w
3
P
f
1
$f
2
f
1
P
f
1
$f
2
f
2
P
f
1
$f
2
f
3
P
f
1
$f
2
f
4
f
1
f
1
w
1
w
2
w
2
w
2
w
3
w
3
w
3
w
1
^
P
w
2
^
P
w
3
^
P
f
1
^
P
f
2
^
P
f
3
^
P
f
4
f
2
f
2
w
1
w
2
w
2
w
2
^
P
f
1
$f
2
w
2
^
P
f
1
$f
2
w
3
^
P
f
1
$f
2
f
1
^
P
f
1
$f
2
f
2
^
P
f
1
$f
2
f
3
^
P
f
1
$f
2
f
4
f
1
f
1
w
2
w
1
w
2
w
2
Let w
1
's information
~
P
 w
1
be such that Prf
~
P
 w
1
= P
 w
1
g = Prf
~
P
 w
1
=
P
f
1
$f
2
 w
1
g = Prf
~
P
 w
1
=
^
P
 w
1
g = Prf
~
P
 w
1
=
^
P
f
1
$f
2
 w
1
g =
1
4
. Then worker w
1
's
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information is ff
1
; f
2
g-symmetric and ff
3
; f
4
g-symmetric.
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Let P
w
1
: f
1
; f
2
; w
1
; f
3
; f
4
be w
1
's true preference. Note that
~
P
 w
1
is
A(P
w
1
)-symmetric and FnA(P
w
1
)-symmetric. We show that it is optimal for
w
1
to submit P
0
w
1
: f
1
; f
3
; f
4
; f
2
; w
1
.
It follows as in Example 1 thatM [P ](w
1
) = f
2
andM [P
w
1
; P
f
1
$f
2
 w
1
](w
1
) =
f
1
. It is easy to check thatM [P
w
1
;
^
P
 w
1
](w
1
) = f
1
andM [P
w
1
;
^
P
f
1
$f
2
 w
1
](w
1
) =
f
2
. Thus, if w
1
submits P
w
1
, then w
1
is matched with probability
1
2
to f
1
and
with probability
1
2
to f
2
.
Under [P
0
w
1
; P
 w
1
], (w
1
; f
2
) is a (4; 1) match whereas (w
1
; f
1
) is a (1; 3)
match. Thus, because (1,3) matches have higher priority than (4,1) matches
and there are no (1,1), (1,2), and (2,1) matches, we have M [P
0
w
1
; P
 w
1
](w
1
) =
f
1
. It is easy to check that M [P
0
w
1
; P
f
1
$f
2
 w
1
](w
1
) = f
1
, M [P
0
w
1
;
^
P
 w
1
](w
1
) = f
1
,
and M [P
0
w
1
;
^
P
f
1
$f
2
 w
1
](w
1
) = f
2
. Thus, if w
1
submits P
0
w
1
, then w
1
is matched
with probability
3
4
to f
1
and with probability
1
4
to f
2
{ an improvement over
truthful revelation.
Note that w
1
cannot be matched with higher probability to f
1
by submit-
ting another list. If she does not include f
2
in her list, then under
^
P
f
1
$f
2
 w
1
she
remains unemployed. However, when her submitted list contains f
2
, then
she needs to include at least one unacceptable position because otherwise
she will not be matched under P
 w
1
to f
1
. Therefore, for w
1
only strategies
which rank unacceptable positions as acceptable are optimal. 
C Linear Programming Mechanisms
First we dene linear programming mechanisms formally. Second we ex-
tend our analysis to mechanisms choosing for each prole a lottery over all
matchings. Third we establish Corollary 2 by showing that any linear pro-
gramming mechanism satises the probabilistic analogues of the properties
of Theorem 2. Fourth we provide two example to demonstrate that in the
London market and the Cambridge market a participant may benet from
including unacceptable matches in her submitted rank-order list.
A linear programming mechanism assigns to each possible (a; b) match a
positive weight. These weights are strictly decreasing in both components.
16
Formally we would need to add another four proles for switching the positions of f
3
and f
4
. However, at each of the above proles, switching f
3
and f
4
does not change the
rank-order list for each agent and a priority mechanism only takes the prole of rank-order
lists into account.
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Formally, a weighting function is a function h : (N  N) [ f(0; 0)g ! R
+
such that (i) h(0; 0) = 0, (ii) for all (a; b); (a
0
; b) 2 N  N , if a < a
0
, then
h(a; b) > h(a
0
; b), and (iii) for all (a; b); (a; b
0
) 2 N  N , if b < b
0
, then
h(a; b) > h(a; b
0
). Recall that rank(f; P
w
) denotes the rank of f in P
w
and
rank(w; P
f
) the rank of w in P
f
. If f is most preferred under P
w
, then
rank(f; P
w
)=1. We also set rank(w; P
w
) = 0. Given a prole P 2 P and an
individually rational matching  the score of  is the sum of the weights of
the matched worker-rm pairs, i.e.
s
h
(; P ) =
X
w2W
h(rank((w); P
w
); rank(w; P
(w)
)):
Given a weighting function h, the linear programmingmechanismM
h
chooses
for each prole P 2 P an individually rational matching with maximal score
among all individually rational matchings. Let argmax s
h
(; P ) denote the
set of all individually rational matchings which maximize the weighted score
s
h
among all individually rational matchings. We will assume that if there
are several matchings maximizing the score under a submitted prole, then
the linear programming mechanism breaks the ties uniformly, i.e. each of
these maximizers is chosen with equal probability. In such a case a linear
programming mechanism chooses a lottery over matchings. We will see that
this does not create any signicant problem. Below we extend our analysis
to mechanisms choosing a lottery for each prole.
For the remaining part of Appendix C let M denote a probabilistic mech-
anism choosing for each prole P a lottery over M. Given a matching ,
let PrfM [P ] = g denote the probability that M assigns to  when the
prole of submitted rankings is P . Similarly, given w 2 W and f 2 F , let
PrfM [P ](w) = fg denote the probability that w is assigned to f under the
lottery M [P ].
For probabilistic mechanisms the properties anonymity, positive associa-
tion, individual rationality, and independence of truncations are given below.
Anonymity: For all P 2 P, all  2 M, and all f; f
0
2 F , PrfM [P ] =
g = PrfM [P
f$f
0
] = 
f$f
0
g.
Positive Association: For all P 2 P, all w 2 W , and all f; f
0
2 F , if
PrfM [P ](w) = fg > 0 and f
0
>
P
w
f , then PrfM [P
f$f
0
w
; P
 w
](w) = fg = 1.
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Individual Rationality: For all P 2 P, all v 2 V , and all  2 M, if
PrfM [P ] = g > 0, then (v) 
P
v
v.
Independence of Truncations: For all P 2 P, all w 2 W , all P
0
w
2 P
w
,
and all f 2 F , if P
0
w
is a truncation of P
w
, PrfM [P ](w) = fg > 0, and f is
acceptable under P
0
w
, then for all f
0
2 A(P
0
w
), PrfM [P
0
w
; P
 w
](w) = f
0
g 
PrfM [P ](w) = f
0
g.
It is straightforward to check that Theorem 4 remains true for probabilis-
tic mechanisms satisfying anonymity and positive association. Furthermore
(1) in the proof of Theorem 4 is also valid. Then it is easy to see that
Theorem 2 holds for probabilistic mechanisms.
The linear programming mechanism with weighting function h is formally
dened as follows: for all P 2 P and all individually rational matchings 
such that
s
h
(;R) = max

0
is individually rational
s
h
(
0
; R);
we have PrfM
h
[P ] = g = 1=jargmax s
h
(; P )j (here jSj denotes the cardi-
nality of set S).
Proof of Corollary 2. Let M
h
be a linear programming mechanism with
weighting function h. By Theorem 2, it suces to show that M
h
is a proba-
bilistic mechanism satisfying anonymity, positive association, individual ra-
tionality, and independence of truncations. By denition, M
h
satises indi-
vidual rationality.
In showing anonymity, let P 2 P,  2 M, and f; f
0
2 F . Then for
all w 2 W , rank(w; P
f
) = rank(w; P
f$f
0
f
0
), rank(w; P
f
0
) = rank(w; P
f$f
0
f
),
rank(f; P
w
) = rank(f
0
; P
f$f
0
w
), and rank(f
0
; P
w
) = rank(f; P
f$f
0
w
). Thus,
s
h
(; P ) = s
h
(
f$f
0
; P
f$f
0
). Because  was arbitrary, we have PrfM
h
[P ] =
g =PrfM
h
[P
f$f
0
] = 
f$f
0
g, the desired conclusion.
In showing positive association, let P 2 P, w 2 W , and f; f
0
2 F be
such that PrfM
h
[P ](w) = fg > 0 and f
0
>
P
w
f . Let  2 argmax s
h
(; P ) be
such that (w) = f . Because h is strictly decreasing and rank(f; P
f$f
0
w
) <
rank(f; P
w
), we have s
h
(; [P
f$f
0
w
; P
 w
]) > s
h
(; P ). Furthermore, for all
matchings 
0
which are individually rational under P , if 
0
(w) 6= f , then
s
h
(
0
; [P
f$f
0
w
; P
 w
])  s
h
(
0
; P ). By PrfM
h
[P ](w) = fg > 0 and individual
rationality ofM
h
, the set of individually rational matchings is identical under
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P and [P
f$f
0
w
; P
 w
]. Hence, PrfM
h
[P
f$f
0
w
; P
 w
](w) = fg = 1, the desired
conclusion.
In showing independence of truncations, let P 2 P, w 2 W , P
0
w
2 P
w
,
and f 2 F be such that P
0
w
is a truncation of P
w
, PrfM [P ](w) = fg > 0,
and f is acceptable under P
0
w
. Since P
0
w
is a truncation of P
w
, we have for
all matchings , (i) if  is individually rational under [P
0
w
; P
 w
], then  is
individually rational under P , and (ii) if  is individually rational under
[P
0
w
; P
 w
], then s
h
(; [P
0
w
; P
 w
]) = s
h
(; P ). Because PrfM [P ](w) = fg > 0
and f is acceptable under P
0
w
, there exists  2 argmax s
h
(; P ) such that
(w) = f and  is individually rational under [P
0
w
; P
 w
]. Then it follows that
argmax s
h
(; [P
0
w
; P
 w
]) is the set of matchings which maximize s
h
under P
and satisfy individual rationality under [P
0
w
; P
 w
]. Hence, for all f
0
2 A(P
0
w
),
PrfM
h
[P
0
w
; P
 w
](w) = f
0
g  PrfM
h
[P ](w) = f
0
g, the desired conclusion. 
The following two examples show that the linear programming mech-
anisms used in the U.K. also have the aw that it is possible that only
strategies which rank unacceptable positions as acceptable are optimal for a
student.
Example 3 (London 1973 Market) In the London Hospital Medical Col-
lege choices 1, 2, 3, and 4 are given weights 20, 14, 9, and 5, respectively
(Shah and Farrow, 1974). Thus, (1,1) matches have weight 20 + 20 = 40,
(1,2) and (2,1) matches weight 14 + 20 = 34, (1,3) and (3,1) matches weight
9 + 20 = 29, and (1,4) and (4,1) matches weight 5 + 20 = 25.
Consider Example 2. Note that under all proles which w
1
believes
with positive probability under
~
P
 w
1
, there is no pair (w; f) such that w 2
fw
2
; w
3
g and (w; f) are mutually acceptable. Since a linear programming
mechanism only chooses individually rational matchings, for each of these
proles the linear programming mechanism matches w
1
to the rm f with
maximal weight.
Given the above weights, the weight of a (2,1) match is greater than the
weight of a (1,3) match and the weight of a (1,3) match is greater than the
weight of a (4,1) match. Then the same conclusions hold for the London
mechanism as in Example 2: If P
w
1
: f
1
; f
2
; w
1
; f
3
; f
4
is w
1
's true preference,
then it is optimal for w
1
to submit P
0
w
1
: f
1
; f
3
; f
4
; f
2
; w
1
.
Note that it is suboptimal for w
1
to include only one acceptable rm in her
list. If w
1
would submit P
00
w
1
: f
1
; f
3
; f
2
; w
1
, then under [P
00
w
1
; P
 w
1
], (w
1
; f
1
) is
a (1,3) match and (w
1
; f
2
) is a (3,1) match and both result in the same weight
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29. If the linear programming mechanism breaks ties with equal probability,
then by submitting P
00
w
1
, w
1
is matched with probability
5
8
to f
1
and with
probability
3
8
to f
2
. This is suboptimal for w
1
because by submitting P
0
w
1
, w
1
is matched with probability
3
4
to f
1
and with probability
1
4
to f
2
. Therefore,
for w
1
only strategies which rank both unacceptable positions as acceptable
are optimal. 
Example 4 (Cambridge 1978 Market) Let W = fw
1
; w
2
; w
3
g and F =
ff
1
; f
2
; f
3
g. We use the same weights for the Cambridge linear programming
mechanism as Roth (1991). Let M be the linear programming mechanism
which assigns to matches (1,1), (2,1), (3,1), (1,2), (2,2), (3,2), and (1,3)
weights 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, and 2, respectively. Let P
 w
1
and
^
P
 w
1
be such that
P
w
2
P
w
3
P
f
1
P
f
2
P
f
3
f
1
f
3
w
1
w
2
w
3
w
3
w
1
w
2
P
f
1
$f
2
w
2
P
f
1
$f
2
w
3
P
f
1
$f
2
f
1
P
f
1
$f
2
f
2
P
f
1
$f
2
f
3
f
2
f
3
w
2
w
1
w
3
w
1
w
3
w
2
^
P
w
2
^
P
w
3
^
P
f
1
^
P
f
2
^
P
f
3
f
2
f
2
w
1
w
2
w
2
^
P
f
1
$f
2
w
2
^
P
f
1
$f
2
w
3
^
P
f
1
$f
2
f
1
^
P
f
1
$f
2
f
2
^
P
f
1
$f
2
f
3
f
1
f
1
w
2
w
1
w
2
Let w
1
's information
~
P
 w
1
be such that Prf
~
P
 w
1
= P
 w
1
g = Prf
~
P
 w
1
=
P
f
1
$f
2
 w
1
g = Prf
~
P
 w
1
=
^
P
 w
1
g = Prf
~
P
 w
1
=
^
P
f
1
$f
2
 w
1
g =
1
4
. Then worker w
1
's
information is ff
1
; f
2
g-symmetric.
Let P
w
1
: f
1
; f
2
; w
1
be w
1
's true preference. We show that it is optimal
for w
1
to submit P
0
w
1
: f
1
; f
3
; f
2
; w
1
.
Let  be such that (w
i
) = f
i
for i 2 f1; 2; 3g. Under P , (w
1
; f
1
) is a (1,2)
match, (w
2
; f
2
) is a (1,3) match, and (w
3
; f
3
) is a (1,1) match. Thus, under P
the score of  is 5+2+8 = 15. Let 
0
be such that 
0
(w
1
) = f
2
, 
0
(w
2
) = w
2
,
and 
0
(w
3
) = f
3
. Under P , (w
1
; f
2
) is a (2,1) match and (w
3
; f
3
) is a (1,1)
match. Thus, under P the score of 
0
is 7 + 8 = 15. It is easy to check that
 and 
0
are the two individually rational matchings with maximal score
under P . Because M breaks the tie with equal probabilities,  is chosen
with probability
1
2
and 
0
is chosen with probability
1
2
under P .
It is left to the reader to check thatM [P
w
1
; P
f
1
$f
2
 w
1
](w
1
) = f
1
,M [P
w
1
;
^
P
 w
1
](w
1
) =
f
1
, and M [P
w
1
;
^
P
f
1
$f
2
 w
1
](w
1
) = f
2
. Hence, if w
1
submits P
w
1
, then she is
matched with probability
5
8
to f
1
and with probability
3
8
to f
2
.
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Under [P
0
w
1
; P
 w
1
], (w
1
; f
2
) becomes a (3; 1) match. Thus, the score
of 
0
decreases by 1 whereas the score of  remains unchanged. Hence,
M [P
0
w
1
; P
 w
1
](w
1
) = f
1
. The other choices are identical when submitting P
0
w
1
or P
w
1
. Hence, if w
1
submits P
0
w
1
, then she is matched with probability
3
4
to
f
1
and with probability
1
4
to f
2
{ an improvement over truthful revelation.
Note that w
1
cannot be matched with higher probability to f
1
by submit-
ting another list. If she does not include f
2
in her list, then under
^
P
f
1
$f
2
 w
1
she
remains unemployed. However, when her submitted list contains f
2
, then
she needs to include at least one unacceptable position because otherwise
she will be matched with positive probability to f
2
under P
 w
1
. Therefore,
for w
1
only strategies which rank unacceptable positions as acceptable are
optimal. 
D The DA-Algorithm
First we establish Corollary 3 by showing that the DA-algorithm satises
the properties of Theorem 2. Second we provide the example by Roth and
Rothblum (1999) to demonstrate that only strategies which rank unaccept-
able matches as acceptable may be optimal for a participant.
Proof of Corollary 3. By Theorem 2 it suces to show that the DA-
algorithm satises anonymity, positive association, individual rationality, and
independence of truncations. It is straightforward that the DA-algorithm is
anonymous and individually rational.
In showing positive association, let P 2 P, w 2 W , and f; f
0
2 F be
such that DA[P ](w) = f and f
0
>
P
w
f . Let V
0
= fv 2 F [ fwg j f 
P
w
vg.
Then P
w
jV
0
= P
f$f
0
w
jV
0
. When applying the DA-algorithm to P , w only
receives oers from rms belonging to V
0
. Thus, by P
w
jV
0
= P
f$f
0
w
jV
0
, when
applying the DA-algorithm to [P
f$f
0
w
; P
 w
], w makes the same rejections
and acceptances and only receives oers from rms belonging to V
0
. Hence,
DA[P
f$f
0
w
; P
 w
](w) = f , the desired conclusion.
In showing independence of truncations, let P 2 P, w 2 W , and P
0
w
2 P
w
be such that P
0
w
is a truncation of P
w
and M [P ](w) is acceptable under P
0
w
.
Let  = M [P ]. Since (w) 2 A(P
0
w
),  is stable under [P
0
w
; P
 w
]. Let 
0
de-
note the rm-optimal matching under [P
0
w
; P
 w
]. If  is not the rm-optimal
matching under [P
0
w
; P
 w
], then (w) 
P
0
w

0
(w) and for all w
0
2 Wnfwg,
(w
0
) 
P
w
0

0
(w
0
) (Gale and Shapley, 1962). Because the set of unmatched
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workers is the same under any two stable matchings (Roth and Sotomayor,
1990, Theorem 2.22) and (w) = f , we have 
0
(w) 6= w. Thus, 
0
(w) >
P
w
w
and (w) 
P
w

0
(w). Hence, by the stability of 
0
under [P
0
w
; P
 w
], 
0
is
stable under P . Because  6= 
0
and for all w
0
2 W , (w
0
) 
P
w
0

0
(w
0
), this
contradicts the fact that DA[P ] =  and the DA-algorithm computes for
each prole its rm-optimal stable matching (Gale and Shapley, 1962). 
Matching markets using the DA-algorithm also have the drawback that
it is possible that only rank-order lists including unacceptable positions are
optimal for a physician. For the sake of completeness we provide the example
given by Roth and Rothblum (1999).
Example 5 (Roth and Rothblum, 1999, Example 3) LetW  fw
1
; w
2
g
and F  ff
1
; f
2
; f
3
g. Let P
1
 w
1
; P
2
 w
1
; P
3
 w
1
; P
4
 w
1
2 P
 w
1
be such that
P
w
2
P
f
1
P
f
2
P
f
3
f
2
w
2
w
1
w
2
f
1
w
1
w
2
w
1
f
3
P
f
1
$f
2
w
2
P
f
1
$f
2
f
1
P
f
1
$f
2
f
2
P
f
1
$f
2
f
3
f
2
w
2
w
1
w
2
f
3
w
1
w
2
w
1
f
1
^
P
w
2
^
P
f
1
^
P
f
2
^
P
f
3
f
2
w
2
w
1
w
2
f
1
w
2
f
3
^
P
f
1
$f
2
w
2
^
P
f
1
$f
2
f
1
^
P
f
1
$f
2
f
2
^
P
f
1
$f
2
f
3
f
2
w
2
w
1
w
2
f
3
w
2
f
1
Under
~
P
 w
1
worker w
1
believes each of the proles P
 w
1
, P
f
1
$f
2
 w
1
,
^
P
 w
1
, and
^
P
f
1
$f
2
 w
1
with probability
1
4
. Then
~
P
 w
1
is ff
2
; f
3
g-symmetric.
Let P
w
1
: f
1
; f
2
; w
1
; f
3
be w
1
's true preference. If she submits P
w
1
,
then she is matched with probability
1
4
to f
1
(by DA[P
w
1
; P
f
1
$f
2
 w
1
](w
1
) =
f
1
) and with probability
3
4
to f
2
(by DA[P ](w
1
) = DA[P
w
1
;
^
P
 w
1
](w
1
) =
DA[P
w
1
;
^
P
f
1
$f
2
 w
1
](w
1
) = f
2
).
If w
1
submits P
0
w
1
: f
1
; f
3
; f
2
; w
1
, then under P
 w
1
she is matched to f
1
and for the other proles the DA-algorithm assigns her the same position.
Thus, she is matched with probability
1
2
to f
1
and with probability
1
2
to f
2
.
It is now easy to see that w
1
's unique optimal strategy is to submit P
0
w
1
, i.e.
ranking an unacceptable rm as acceptable is optimal. 
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